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 1
COMING OUT IS A FREE PASS OUT:  BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V . DALE1 
Indeed, the overarching goal . . . is nothing less than the eradication “of the cancer of 
discrimination.”2   
 
On the other hand, “[a] society in which each and every organization must be equally 
diverse is a society which has destroyed diversity.”3 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,4 the Supreme Court of the United States “convert[ed] 
the right of expressive association into an easy trump of any anti-discrimination law.”5  For 
years, states have been attempting to prevent discrimination by enacting public accommodation 
laws that give individuals equal access to public goods and services.6  Recently, many state 
legislatures have amended their public accommodation laws, adding homosexuals to the list of 
protected individuals.7 
                                                 
1 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). 
 
2 Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652, 660 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Jackson v. Concord Co., 253 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1969)) 
(describing the purpose of New Jersey’s public accommodation statute). 
 
3 Petitioners’ Brief at *19-*20, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (No. 99-699). 
 
4 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). 
 
5 Id. at 2479 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Others argue that if the government is not restricted, freedom of expression will 
become a fiction.  Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 
1137, 1147 (1983). 
 
6 Marissa L. Goodman, Note, A Scout is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean, Trustworthy . . . And Heterosexual?  Gays 
in the Boy Scouts of America, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 825, 828-33 (1999); See also  Sally Frank, The Key to Unlocking 
the Clubhouse Door: The Application of Antidiscrimination Laws to Quasi-Private Clubs, 2 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
27, 39-55 (1994) (discussing the effects of using different statutory constructions for public accommodation laws 
when applied to “quasi-private clubs,” including definitions based upon business aspects, public use and physical 
place). 
 
7 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW:  CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 356-61 (1999) (listing 
examples of state and municipal laws against sexual orientation discrimination between 1972 and 1998).  See also  
Jose Gomez, The Public Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood as Protected Speech, 1 LAW & INEQ. J. 121, 121-
23 (1983) (citing examples of various rights denied to individuals based upon sexual orientation). 
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 This Note discusses the three Supreme Court cases that have delineated the battle 
between public accommodation laws and an organization’s freedom of expressive association: 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees,8 Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of 
Duarte,9 and New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York.10  Specifically, this 
Note focuses on the development of the balancing test which courts use to protect these two 
constitutional freedoms.11  This Note then analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts 
of America v. Dale, pointing out its deviations from the Roberts Trilogy. 12  Finally, this Note 
explains the consequences of the Supreme Court’s reasoning, specifically concentrating on the 
determination of an association’s expression; the blurring of the freedom of association and the 
freedom of speech; and the silencing of self- identifying speech. 13 
II. BACKGROUND 
 Although not an enumerated right, the Supreme Court has recognized a right to the 
freedom of association.  This right was first expressed by the Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex. 
rel. Patterson,14 describing it as a “freedom to engage in associations for the advocacy of beliefs 
                                                 
 
8  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 
9 Board of Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
 
10 New York State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988). 
 
11 See infra  Part II. 
 
12 See infra  Part III.C.  The Roberts Trilogy refers to the three Supreme Court cases involving the issue of public 
accommodation laws conflicting with an organization’s freedom of association:  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609 (1984), Board of Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987), and New York 
State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York , 487 U.S. 1 (1988).  See Karen L. Dayton, Note, Dale v. Boy Scouts of 
America: New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination Weighs the Balance Between the First Amendment and the 
State’s Compelling Interest in Eradicating Discrimination, 16 GA. ST . U. L. REV. 387, 414 (1999). 
  
13 See infra  Part IV. 
 
14 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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and ideas.”15  The Court later divided this right into two distinct parts:  the freedom of intimate 
association and the freedom of expressive association. 16   
The freedom of expressive association is rooted in the freedom to collectively espouse 
beliefs and ideas.17  Inherent in this right is the concept that a group of people, within an 
association, may more effectively advocate an idea.18  People also join associations to create a 
sense of community by associating with people who share common interests, backgrounds, 
viewpoints, and philosophies; a freedom indispensable to liberty. 19  Yet, inherent in the right to 
associate is a right to disassociate.20  An organization’s freedom of expressive association may 
be infringed upon by either impairing the group’s ability to engage in protected activities or by 
                                                 
15 Id. at 460.  The Supreme Court has construed the freedom of association differently so that in some cases the 
Court has actually found no fundamental right to associate.  Shawn M. Larsen, Note, For Blacks Only:  The 
Associational Freedoms of Private Minority Clubs, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 359, 366 n.50 (1999). 
 
16 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).  The Court defined intimate association as 
including the freedom to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships, including “marriage . . . 
childbirth . . . raising and educating children . . . and cohabitation with one’s relatives.” Id. at 619 (citations omitted).  
To determine if an organization has a right of intimate association, the Court looks to the size, purpose, policies, and 
selectivity of the group.  Id. at 620.  The Court defined expressive association as a freedom to associate for the 
purpose of  “engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment – speech, assembly, petition for the 
redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”  Id. at 618.  The freedom at stake and an objective assessment of 
the relationship’s attachment dictate the amount of constitutional protection. Id.  
 
17 See supra  notes 14-15 and accompanying text.  One of the underlying purposes of the freedom of expressive 
association is to preserve diversity by protecting the expression of minority viewpoints.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
 
18 See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added). 
 
19 Frank, supra  note 6, at 31-34 (discussing the various reasons why people join organizations, including 
community, political, religious, or business reasons).  There is often a desire to associate with similar individuals, 
thereby excluding individuals who are different.  Id. at 34. 
 
20 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977).  In Abood, the Supreme Court found that 
requiring a person to make a political contribution, as opposed to prohibiting a person from making a contribution, is 
a violation of the First Amendment.  Id. at 234. 
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imposing restrictions on the group’s ability to exclude individuals with different ideologies or 
philosophies.21 
 In contrast, public accommodation laws have been enacted to prevent discrimination in 
places of public accommodation. 22  These laws encompass a multitude of diverse 
organizations.23  The interest of an individual to choose those with whom he associates, 
implicitly choosing those from who to disassociate, and the state’s interest in eradicating 
discrimination may often directly conflict.24  Battle lines are drawn when a public 
accommodation law is used to open the membership of an organization because it asserts a 
                                                 
21 Andrew J. Breuner, Comment, Expression by Association:  Towards Defining an Expressive Association Defense 
in Unruh-Based Sexual Orientation Discrimination Actions, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 467, 473 (1993) (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s finding of potential infringements in Roberts, Rotary International , and New York State Club 
Association). 
 
22 The Supreme Court has held that it is within the state’s power to enact public accommodation laws when the 
legislature believes a group is the target of invidious discrimination.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627-29 (1996) 
(discussing the common evolution of public accommodation laws).  One highly-supported scholar attributes the 
conflict to a greater tension between “egalitarian, rights-oriented liberalism” and “communitarianism.”  Douglas O. 
Linder, Comment, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1878, 1881 
(1984).  The former seeks a system providing equal opportunity to pursue beliefs and goals to form identity.  Id.  
The latter seeks a system preventing state interference in order to preserve communities, which form identity.  Id.  
 
23 See Erika M. Brown & Stephanie Greene, From Private Clubs to Parades: How Accommodating Are State Laws?   
42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 125, 130-40 (1998) (citing examples of organizations found by the courts to be subject to 
public accommodation laws including a country club, gun club, university eating club, and The Boy’s Club; 
however, a debate and literary club, French family club, a city parade, and The Elk’s Lodge were not subject to 
public accommodation laws).  See also  William F. Grady, Comment, The Boy Scouts of America as a “Place of 
Public Accommodation”: Developments in State Law, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 517, 524-42 (1999) (outlining various 
public accommodation laws as applied to the Boy Scouts of America). 
 
24 Goodman, supra  note 6, at 834-35.  The Court framed its reasoning on the assumption that the freedom of 
association applies to the group’s right to exclude individuals, which is termed a negative right of association.  
Andrew M. Perlman, Public Accommodation Laws and the Dual Nature of the Freedom of Association, 8 GEO. 
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 111, 113 (1997).  However, if the Court would recognize a positive right to associate, 
which is based upon an individual’s right to associate with others providing society’s goods and services, the 
negative right to associate would be superseded.  Id. at 114-18.  
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constitutional right to discriminate.25  In order to define each of their limits, it is necessary to 
visit the line of cases dealing with these conflicting interests. 
A. Roberts v. United States Jaycees26 
 In 1984, the United States Jaycees27 challenged the application of the Minnesota Human 
Rights Act,28 which required the Jaycees to admit women.  The Supreme Court, while 
acknowledging that the Jaycees had the right to associate for expressive purposes, characterized 
this right as not absolute.29  The Court stated that “infringements on that right may be justified by 
regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that 
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”30  The 
Court recognized two compelling state interests:  ensuring equal access to goods and services31 
                                                 
25 See Frank, supra  note 6, at 57.  Organizations assert a constitutional right to discriminate by relying on Justice 
Douglas’ dissent in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.  See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas stated that the Constitution permits “all white, all black, all brown, and all 
yellow clubs to be formed.”  Id. at 180.  However, he later points out that when the public domain is implicated, one 
may not exercise this right.  Id.  At odds with the majority, Justice Douglas argued that, by definition, a private club 
could never be within the public domain.  Id.  Others argue that society must accept the costs, including 
discrimination, to preserve diversity because forced acceptance in order to uphold society’s principles will slowly 
erode an organization’s distinctive character.  William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political 
Pluralism:  Three Sources of Liberal Theory, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 869, 875 (1999). 
 
26 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 
27 As set out in its bylaws, the Jaycees’ objective is to develop a young men’s civic organization designed to 
promote patriotism, personal development, and friendship.  Id. at 612. 
 
28 MINN. STAT . § 363.03 (1982).  The Act prohibited discrimination based on gender in places of public 
accommodation.  Id.  A place of public accommodation is a business providing public goods and services for the 
purpose of the political, social, and economic advancement of the public.  MINN. STAT . § 363.01 (1982). 
 
29 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.  Since the freedom of expression is not absolute, courts justify restrictions of expression 
when there is a probability that the expression will give rise to an apprehended harm, the harm is grave, and 
restriction of expression is necessary to decrease the likelihood of the harm.  Elliot L. Richardson, Freedom of 
Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1951). 
 
30 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.  The Court found that the Jaycees did not have a right of intimate association because 
the group was too large and unselective.  Id. at 620-21. 
 
31 Id. at 624.   
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and eliminating a stigmatizing injury based upon stereotypes.32  The Court reasoned that 
admitting women into the Jaycees would not impede the Jaycees’ “ability to engage in these 
protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views,”33 therefore, applying Minnesota’s 
public accommodation law would not violate the Jaycees’ freedom of expressive association. 34   
B. Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte35 
 In 1987, the Supreme Court, following the reasoning of Roberts,36 held that the 
application of the Unruh Act37 to local Rotary Clubs,38 which required the admission of women, 
would not significantly affect the existing members’ ability to carry out their various expressive 
purposes.39  The Court reasoned that the Unruh Act would not require the club to “abandon or 
alter” any of their activities.40  Furthermore, the Court felt that even if the Unruh Act did infringe 
                                                 
32 Id. at 625. 
 
33 Id. at 627. “[D]iscrimination based on archaic and overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities 
of the sexes forces individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual 
abilities.”  Id. at 625.  “[W]e decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that underlies [the Jaycees’] contention, 
that by allowing women to vote, . . . [it] will change the content or impact of the organization’s speech.”  Roberts, 
468 U.S. at 623. 
 
34 Id. at 627.  The Court found the admission of women would not require the Jaycees to change its creed, or prohibit 
its ability to exclude those with different philosophies.  Id. 
 
35 See Board of Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987). 
 
36 Id. at 544-45.  
 
37 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 51 (West 1982) (providing for equal access to all business establishments). 
 
38 As stated in its procedure manual, Rotary International is a service organization of business and professional men 
advocating ethical standards in all vocations.  Rotary Int’l , 481 U.S. at 539.  The Court denied protection of intimate 
association because of the club’s size and membership selectivity.  Id. at 546. 
   
39 Id. at 548.  “Rotary Clubs engage in a variety of commendable service activities that are protected by the First 
Amendment.  But the Unruh Act does not require . . . them to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, 
high ethical standards in all vocations, good will, and peace.”  Id. 
 
40 Id.  The Court believed that, with an open membership, the club would get a more accurate representation of the 
community, therefore achieving its goals of service and promoting ethical business standards.  Id. at 549-50. 
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on the club’s right of expressive association, the infringement was justified because the Act 
served a compelling state interest.41 
C. New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York42 
 The New York State Club Association43 sought a declaration that New York City’s 
Human Rights Law44 was facially unconstitutional because it infringed on the organization’s 
freedom of association.  Once again, the Supreme Court held that the public accommodation law 
would not require clubs to “abandon or alter” any of their activities.45  The Court, thinking 
ahead, noted that an organization could potentially show a violation of its freedom of expressive 
association if it were organized specifically for that expressive purpose.46  These three cases have 
given organizations the opportunity to discriminate, so long as the discriminatory acts are 
manifested in their expressive purpose.  
                                                 
41 Id. at 549.  In this case, the compelling state interest was eliminating discrimination against women.  Id. 
 
42 New York State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).  The New York State Club Association 
is a non-profit association consisting of 125 private clubs within the state of New York. 
 
43 Id. at 8. 
  
44 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(2) (1986) (prohibiting discrimination in a place of public accommodation because 
of sex, race, creed, color, or national origin).  A place of public accommodation includes restaurants, public halls, 
and theatres, but excludes any place of accommodation that is distinctly private in nature.  N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 
8-102(9) (1986).  In 1984, the Human Rights Law was amended, stating that any place of accommodation with more 
than 400 members is not considered distinctly private in nature.  New York State Club Ass’n , 487 U.S. at 8.    
 
45 Id. at 13.  “Instead, the [l]aw merely prevents an association from using race, sex, and other specified 
characteristics as shorthand measures in place of what the city considers to be more legitimate criteria for 
determining membership.”  Id. 
 
46 Id. 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statement of  Facts 
 In 1989, after actively participating in the association for 11 years,47 the Boy Scouts of 
America (BSA) approved Dale’s application for adult membership in the Boy Scouts as an 
assistant scoutmaster.48  Dale then enrolled at Rutgers University, where he acknowledged to 
himself – and others – that he was gay, and he eventually became co-president of the Rutgers 
University Lesbian/Gay Alliance.49  In 1990, a newspaper, covering a seminar on homosexual 
issues, published an interview with Dale about his advocacy of gay and lesbian teenagers’ need 
for gay role models.50  This article was forwarded to BSA, which revoked Dale’s adult 
                                                 
47 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).  Dale first became a member of the BSA in 1978, when 
he joined the Monmouth Council’s Cub Scout Pack.  Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1204 (N.J. 1999).  
Dale became a Boy Scout in 1981 and attained the rank of Eagle Scout in 1988.  Id.  Dale remained a Scout until he 
turned 18. Id.  During his years as a youth member, Dale was “exemplary,” earning 25 merit badges and 
participating in honorary societies.  Id.   
 
48 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449 (2000).  The sponsoring institution, the local Council, and the national Boy Scouts of 
America organization must approve an adult leader.  Petitioners’ Brief at *4, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 
2446 (2000) (No. 99-699).  The applicant must adhere to the Scout Oath and Law, the Declaration of Religious 
Principle, and satisfy multiple informal criteria, which evaluate the applicant’s moral qualities necessary for 
leadership.  Id.  However, how the BSA determines and evaluates the criteria is not explained.  Goodman, supra  
note 6, at 876 (discussing the differences between membership and leadership requirements in the Boy Scouts of 
America as shown in the respective application forms).  
 
49 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449. 
 
50 See Kinga Borondy, Seminar Addresses Needs of Homosexual Teens, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), July 8, 1990, at 2-
11 (covering a seminar addressing the psychological and health needs of lesbian and gay teenagers). 
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membership shortly thereafter.51  The BSA dismissed Dale because the Boy Scouts “specifically 
forbid[s] membership to homosexuals.”52 
B.  Procedural History 
 In 1992, Dale filed a complaint in the New Jersey Superior Court against the BSA and 
the Monmouth Council, alleging that the Boy Scouts violated New Jersey’s public 
accommodation statute53 by revoking Dale’s membership based sole ly upon his sexual 
                                                 
51 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449.  The letter, from Monmouth Council Executive James W. Kay, instructed Dale to “sever 
any relations” with the BSA.  Dale, 734 A.2d at 1205.  Dale requested a review of his termination, which the 
Northeast Region Review Committee ultimately affirmed.  Id.  On four separate occasions during the review 
process, Dale made specific written requests to various Council members and directors requesting a copy of the 
leadership standards and notice of the review date.  Id.  The BSA never complied or acknowledged Dale’s requests.  
Id. 
 
52 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449.  This policy was stated in Monmouth Council’s reply to Dale’s inquiry into his adult 
membership revocation.  Id.  
 
53  N.J. STAT . ANN. § 10:5-4 & 5-5 (West Supp. 2000).  Section 10:5-4 states:   
Obtaining employment, accommodations and privileges without discrimination; civil 
right:  All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to obtain all 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public 
accommodation, publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other real property 
without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, 
marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex, subject only to 
conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons.  This opportunity is recognized 
and declared a civil right. 
N.J. STAT . ANN. § 10:5-4 (West Supp. 2000).  New Jersey defines a place of public accommodation in § 10:5-5 as:   
As used in this act, unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context: 1.  A 
place of public accommodation shall include, but not be limited to:any tavern, roadhouse, 
hotel, motel, trailer camp, summer camp, day camp, or resort camp, whether for 
entertainment of transient guests or accommodation of those seeking health, recreation or 
rest; any producer, manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, retail shop, store, establishment, 
or concession dealing with goods or services of any kind; any restaurant, eating house, or 
place where food is sold for consumption on the premises; any place maintained for the 
sale of ice cream, ice and fruit preparations or their derivatives, soda water or 
confections, or where any beverages of any kind are retailed for consumption on the 
premises; any garage, any public conveyance operated on land or water, or in the air, any 
stations and terminals thereof; any bathhouse, boardwalk, or seashore accommodation; 
any auditorium, meeting place, or hall; any theatre, motion picture house, music hall, roof 
garden, skating rink, swimming pool, amusement and recreation park, fair, bowling alley, 
gymnasium, shooting gallery, billiard and pool parlor, or other place of amusement; any 
comfort station; any dispensary, clinic or hospital; any public library; any kindergarten, 
primary and secondary school, trade or business school, high school, academy, college 
and university, or any educational institution under the supervision of the State Board of 
Education, or the Commissioner of Education of the State of New Jersey.  Nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to include or to apply to any institution, bona fide club, or 
9
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orientation. 54  The Superior Court’s Chancery Division granted summary judgment in favor of 
BSA, holding that New Jersey’s public accommodation statute was inapplicable because BSA 
was not a place of public accommodation. 55  Alternatively, the Court held that BSA is a 
distinctly private group exempted from the statute.56  Finally, the Court held that the Boy Scouts’ 
First Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government from compelling 
BSA to retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster.57 
 The New Jersey Superior Court’s Appellate Division reversed and remanded, holding 
that BSA was a place of public accommodation under New Jersey’s statute,58 and not a 
“distinctly private” organization. 59  Furthermore, the Appellate Division held that applying New 
                                                                                                                                                             
place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private; nor shall anything 
herein contained apply to any educational facility operated or maintained by a bona fide 
religious or sectarian institution, and the right of a natural parent or one in loco parentis 
to direct the education and upbringing of a child under his control is hereby affirmed; nor 
shall anything herein contained be construed to bar any private secondary or post 
secondary school from using in good faith criteria other than race, creed, color, national 
origin, ancestry or affectional or sexual orientation in the admission of students. 
N.J. STAT . ANN. § 10:5-5 (West Supp. 2000).  In 1991, the New Jersey Legislature amended the Law Against 
Discrimination to include protections based on “affectional or sexu al orientation.”  In New Jersey, the goal of public 
accommodation law is the “eradication of the cancer of discrimination.”  Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652, 660 
(N.J. 1988) (quoting Jackson v. Concord Co., 253 A.2d 793, 799 (N.J. 1969)). 
 
54 The complaint also alleged a violation of New Jersey common law on the same grounds; however, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court and Appellate Division’s rejection of the common law claim, holding it 
was a duplication of the Law Against Discrimination claim.  Dale, 734 A.2d at 1219.  
 
55 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 277 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). 
 
56 Id. 
 
57 Id. 
 
58 Id. at 283.  However, one United States Court of Appeals and four state supreme courts have ruled that the BSA is 
not a place of public accommodation.  See, e.g.,  Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1276 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218, 235 (Cal. 1998); Seabourn v. Coronado Area 
Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385, 406 (Kan. 1995); Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. 
Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 359 (Conn. 1987); Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of Am., 
551 P.2d 465, 469 (Or. 1976). 
 
59 Dale, 706 A.2d at 283. 
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Jersey’s public accommodation law did not violate the BSA’s right to freedom of intimate60 or 
expressive61 association under the First Amendment. 
 The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certiorari62 and, adopting the same reasoning, 
affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision on all three issues.63 
C.  U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
 The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, 64 reversed the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey. 65  The only issue was whether the application of New Jersey’s public accommodation law 
violated the First Amendment’s expressive, associational right of the Boy Scouts of America.66  
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist began by determining whether BSA engages in 
“expressive association.”67  The Court reasoned that an association seeking to transmit a system 
of values engages in expressive activity protected by the First Amendment.68  Next, the Court 
determined whether the forced inclusion of Dale would significantly affect the Boy Scouts’ 
                                                 
60 Id. at 286 (reasoning that the BSA lacks the qualities of an intimate association because of the association’s size, 
advertising and recruiting practices). 
 
61 Id. at 288 ( reasoning that the BSA’s ability to express their views or carry out their activities will not be affected 
in any significant way). 
 
62 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1200 (N.J. 1999).  
 
63 Id. at 1230. 
 
64 Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion in which Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas 
joined.  See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2449-58 (2000).  Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion 
in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.  Id. at 2458-78. (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter also 
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined.  Id. at 2478. (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 
65 Id. at 2458. 
 
66 Id. at 2451. 
 
67 Id. 
 
68 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452.  The Court relied on Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees which stated that “even the training of outdoor survival skills or participation in community service might 
become expressive when the activity is intended to develop good morals, reverence, patriotism, and a desire for self-
improvement.”  Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
11
Endejann: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001
 12 
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.69  To resolve this question, the Court explored 
the nature of the Boy Scouts’ view of homosexuality70 and the possible impairment of that 
view.71  Finally, the Court questioned whether the application of New Jersey’s public 
accommodation law would violate BSA’s freedom of expressive association. 72  Answering 
affirmatively to all three questions, the Court swiftly struck down Dale’s claim.73 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,74 the Supreme Court began its decision by applying the 
balancing test as developed in the Roberts Trilogy. 75  However, the Court failed to make a 
satisfactory review of the BSA’s expressive claim and quickly shifted the BSA’s freedom of 
expressive association claim into a freedom of speech claim, a highly protected constitutional 
right that easily outweighs any state interest.76 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
69 Id. at 2446. 
 
70 Id. at 2451-54.  The BSA’s view of homosexuality was determined from the Scout Oath and Law, a 1978 position 
statement from the President of the BSA to the BSA’s Executive Committee, and a 1991 position statement, which 
was prepared after Dale was expelled, but before this case began.  Id. 
 
71 Id. at 2453-55.  Dale’s presence would force the BSA to send a message to the world and its own members that 
the BSA accepts homosexual orientation as an acceptable form of behavior.  Id. at 2453. 
 
72 Id. at 2455. 
 
73 Id. at 2451-56. 
 
74 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). 
 
75 See supra  note 12 discussing the cases in the Roberts Trilogy.  See also supra  notes 26-46 and accompanying text 
for a d iscussion of the Roberts balancing test.  
 
76 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). 
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A.  Before Boy Scouts of America77 
 In Roberts, the Supreme Court laid down the basic framework for deciding conflicts 
between a state’s interest and an organization’s freedom of expressive association. 78  The Court 
developed a balancing test: weigh the state’s compelling interest79 against the organization’s 
freedom of expressive association. 80  Because a First Amendment right is at stake, the Court 
applies strict scrutiny to each party’s interest.81  In each case, the Court makes an independent 
review of the organization’s expressive purpose by examining its goals, rules, activities, 
membership criteria, and selection process.82   
Roberts requires courts to determine if the regulation would impair the ability of the 
organization’s members to express the views that brought them together, thereby suggesting a 
link between the discriminatory practice and the expressive purpose.83  The Court has articulated 
                                                 
77 Id. 
 
78 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-29 (1984).   
 
79 Id. at 624-26.  The Court recognized two compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of expression:  
providing equal access to goods and services and preventing stigmatizing injury of perpetuating stereotypes.  Id.   
 
80 Id. at 622-29.  Some argue the Court did not create a balancing test, but a rebuttable presumption in favor of the 
state’s compelling interest.  Larsen, supra note 15, at 384. 
 
81 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451 (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 
U.S. 557, 567-68 (1995)).  The Court is required to make an independent review to ensure there is no forbidden 
intrusion into the freedom of expression.  Hurley, 515 U.S . at 567.   
 
82 See, e.g., New York State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988) (provides meals, accepts 
payment from non-members, business transactions made); Board of Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 
481 U.S. 537, 539-41 (1987) (each local club adopts its own rules for admission, membership restricted to men, and 
classification scheme is followed); Roberts v. United States Jaycees , 468 U.S. 609, 626-27 (1984) (acknowledges 
the political positions on various issues, and partakes in civic, charitable, lobbying, and fundraising activities); 
Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 109 (1981) (charter requires 
that only Democrats may participate, and be willing to publicly affiliate for the purpose of selecting a Democratic 
delegate). 
 
83 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.  Two groups that have been suggested to have the ability to link their discrimination and 
expressive purpose are overtly political organizations and gender or race advancement organizations.  Frank, supra  
note 6, at 59-60.  Others suggest different options to interpret the link requirement:  an indirect effect test, 
13
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that the organization must show a serious burden on the member’s expressive purpose. 84   
Serious burdens include changing the creed,85 abandoning or altering the activities,86 hampering 
effective advocacy of the organization’s position, 87 or preventing the organization’s ability to 
exclude individuals with different ideologies or philosophies.88  The Court will uphold an 
expressive view regardless if it finds the view “unwise or irrational.”89  However, the Court had 
consistently refused to give protection based upon stereotypes and pretexts.90   
                                                                                                                                                             
characterization of the organization as commercial or expressive, or direct relation between the discrimination and 
expression.  William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68, 78-81 (1986).  
Justice O’Connor suggested a commerciality test in her concurring opinion.  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 632-38 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  If an organization is primarily commercial in nature, no freedom of association 
protection is warranted.  Id. at 634.  However, if an organization is predominantly expressive, constitutional 
protection is warranted to prevent any affect on the collective voice.  Id. at 635-36.  A commercial distinction would 
benefit organizations, such as the BSA, which express multiple views on subjects, but remain silent on others.  
Recent Cases , Civil Rights – Public Accommodation Statutes – New Jersey Supreme Court Holds that Boy Scouts 
May Not Deny Membership to Homosexuals, 113 HARV. L. REV. 621, 324-25 (1999).  Such a distinction would 
provide an organization such as this the ability to protect its freedom of association because members do not join for 
a primarily commercial purpose.  Id.   
 
84 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626. 
 
85 Id. at 627. 
 
86 See, e.g., New York State Club Ass’n, Inc., 487 U.S. at 13; Board of Dir. of Rotary Int’l , 481 U.S. at 548. 
 
87 New York State Club Ass’n , 487 U.S. at 11. 
 
88 Id. at 13.  See also, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984); Democratic Party of the 
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981).  
 
89 LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 124.  However, these irrational or unwise views must still be constitutional.  Id. at 1205 
n.25.  Within its reasoning, the Court has often held that inclusion of the excluded individual would actually further 
the organization’s principles such as having a wide range of members.  See Board of Dir. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary 
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987).  However, some fear that this will enable the judiciary to tell any 
organization what its creed “really” means.  Charles Colson & Nancy Pearcey, Scouts’ Dishonor, CHRISTIANITY 
TODAY, Nov. 15, 1999, at 128. 
 
90 E.g., New York State Club Ass’n , 487 U.S. at 13 (1988) (“Instead, the law merely prevents an association from 
using race, sex, and the other specified characteristics as shorthand measures in place of what the city considers to 
be more legitimate criteria for determining membership.”); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (“[W]e decline to indulge in the 
sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee’s contention . . .”). 
 
14
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B.  After Boy Scouts of America91 
 In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,92 the Supreme Court, although appearing to utilize the 
balancing test, actually ignored the reasoning developed in the Roberts Trilogy. 93  The Court 
noted that it was required to make an independent review in light of the party’s First Amendment 
claims.94  However, the Court stated that it must give deference not only to what the BSA 
claimed as its expressive view, but also to what it claimed would impair this expression. 95   
The BSA claimed that the requirements of the Boy Scouts to be “morally straight” and 
“clean” prevented admission of homosexuals.96  Because written evidence existed that pertained 
to the BSA’s viewpoint on homosexuality, the Court found no need to review the nature of this 
                                                 
91 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). 
 
92 Id. 
 
93 See supra  note 12 discussing the cases in the Roberts Trilogy.  See also supra  notes 26-46 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the Roberts balancing test. 
 
94 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451.  
 
95 Id. at 2451-54.  “As we gave deference to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we 
must also give deference to an association’s view of what would impair its expression.”  Id. at 2453. 
 
96 Id. at 2452.  The BSA defines morally straight as being:  
A person of strong character, guide your life with honesty, purity, and justice.  Respect 
and defend the rights of all people.  Your relationships with others should be honest and 
open.  Be clean in your speech and actions, and faithful in your religious beliefs.  The 
values you follow as a Scout will help you become virtuous and self-reliant.  
Id. at 2463.  The BSA defines clean as:  
A Scout keeps his body and mind fit and clean.  He chooses the company of those who 
live by these same ideals.  He helps keep his home and community clean . . . .  There is 
another kind of dirt that won’t come off by washing.  It is the kind that shows up in foul 
language and harmful thoughts.  Swear words, profanity, and dirty stories are weapons 
that ridicule other people and hurt their feelings.  The same is true of racial slurs and 
jokes making fun of ethnic groups or people with physical or mental limitations.  A Scout 
knows there is no kindness or honor in such mean-spirited behavior.  He avoids it in his 
own words and deeds.  He defends those who are targets of insults.   
Id.   
 
15
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viewpoint.97  The Court reasoned that Dale’s mere presence would force the BSA to send a 
message that homosexuality is moral.98  The Court made this conclusion without requiring the 
BSA to show some connection between the definitions of “morally straight” and “clean,” and 
their anti-homosexual view. 99  In other words, no link existed between the expressive purpose 
and the discriminatory conduct, as previously required for constitutional protection. 100   
The Court relied on its own reasoning in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston.101  However, Hurley is a freedom of speech claim, not a freedom of 
expressive association claim.102  In that case, the public accommodation law103 that required the 
private parade organizer to include marchers bearing a particular message, violated the 
                                                 
97 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453.  The written evidence the Court relied on were the values of  “morally straight” and 
“clean” in the Scout Oath and Law and a written statement from the president of the BSA to the Executive 
Committee expressing a policy that open homosexuals could not be BSA leaders.  Id. at 2151-53.  The Court also 
looked to other similar statements that were continually modified, but were substantially similar, advocating the 
position that avowed homosexuals were not qualified for membership.  Id. at 2453-55.  The Court referred to these 
statements as the BSA’s “official position.”  Id. at 2455.  However, the BSA did not disseminate these various 
statements to actual members.  Id. at 2463.   
 
98 Id. at 2454.   
 
99 Id. at 2461.  In his dissent, Justice Stevens found that BSA merely has an “exclusionary membership policy.”  Id. 
at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  He based his finding on the fact that the evidence the BSA provided merely 
showed its effort not to admit avowed homosexuals, but failed to connect the policy to its expressive activities.  Id. 
at 2463-64.  He used the Roberts Trilogy as evidence of the failure of the Supreme Court to protect a group's 
exclusionary membership policy.  Id. at 2466-70. 
 
100  See, e.g., New York State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1,13 (1988); Board of Dir. of Rotary 
Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 
(1984); Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122-23 (1981).  
 
101 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 
102 Id. at 568-81.  The Court noted that if the case had been decided under a freedom of association claim, the parade 
organizers would still prevail.  Id. at 580-81.  However, one should note this statement is dicta.  See Darren L. 
Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness:  Hurley, Free Speech, And Gay and Lesbian Equality , 1 U. PA. J. CONST . L. 
85, 104 (1998).  However, courts may follow the dicta in later cases.  Id.  In Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court declined to follow the reasoning in Hurley, distinguishing the facts of the case.  Dale v. Boy 
Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1229 (N.J. 1999).  Dale’s position as a leader in the Boy Scouts was not equivalent 
to a group marching in a parade, nor was it equivalent to pure speech.  Id. 
 
103 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (1992).  This public accommodation law prohibits discrimination based on 
sexual orientation in any place of public accommodation.  Id. 
16
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organizer’s First Amendment rights.104  The Court found the parade was a form of expression 
protected by freedom of speech, 105 and that the presence of GLIB members carrying a banner in 
the parade would force the speaker to alter the content of his message.106  Even the presence of 
“multifarious voices” in the parade did not justify intervention because, as the Court noted, there 
is no requirement of associating for the purpose of disseminating a particular message in order to 
be protected.107  By not requiring a succinct message, the Court alleviated the need for the 
organization to carry the burden of proof as to its expressive purpose.108 
C.  Consequences of Boy Scouts of America109 
1.  Determining an Association’s Expression 
In Boy Scouts of America,110 the Supreme Court failed to properly utilize the Roberts 
balancing test because the BSA did not have to prove that its views would be compromised or 
that Dale would actually promote homosexuality.111  Relying on Hurley, the Court stated that a 
                                                 
 
104 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573. 
 
105 Id. at 568-69. 
 
106 Id. at 573.   
 
107 Id. at 569. 
 
108 Hutchinson, supra  note 102, at 102.  Hutchinson notes that the Court relied on a distinction between homosexuals 
carrying a banner in the parade and homosexuals in the parade.  Id. at 103.  This finding was based upon the 
organizers’ claim that they would allow homosexuals to march, just not as a group carrying a banner.  Id.  This 
distinction only suppresses homosexual identity.  Id.  It permits discrimination if carrying a banner, or in other 
words, communicating sexual orientation.  Id.  Because sexual orientation is an invisible characteristic, it suppresses 
all sexual identifying language, but only when the language comes from a homosexual.  Id. 
 
109 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). 
 
110 Id. 
 
111 Hutchinson, supra note 102, at 91 (suggesting that Hurley will play an important role in future decisions and 
could possibly alter the Roberts Trilogy.)  See also infra  note 114. 
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succinct message was not required for constitutional protection of expressive association. 112  
However, the constitutional protection of the association is based upon the notion that a 
viewpoint is more effectively communicated when it is expressed in one voice.113   
Critics argue that by not requiring a succinct, articulated message, the organization is not 
required to show why the admission of the excluded individual would burden its specific purpose 
or that the individual even has a distinct message.114  This lenient approach gives courts broad 
discretion to decide what facts are relevant in determining an organization’s expressive 
purpose,115 thereby enabling the BSA members and leaders’ viewpoints to be mistaken as the 
organization’s expressive purpose.116    
                                                 
112 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2543. The Court found support from its own decision in Hurley, where the parade organizers 
were able to exclude individuals although the parade’s purpose was not to send a particular message.  Id.  See also  
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569-70 (1995). 
 
113 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).  One could argue that inherent in the 
concept of expressive association is a requirement that the association collectively espouse one, succinct message. 
 
114 See, e.g., Frank, supra  note 6, at 62 (“Before a court permits an organization to discriminate, it should continue to 
require that a discriminatory practice is necessary to the expressive message that an organization wishes to convey . . 
. .  If courts require a lesser showing of such a relationship, clubs may make expressive claims that are in fact 
pretextual.”); Cara J. Frey, Comment, Hate Exposed to the Light of Day:  Determining the Boy Scouts of America’s 
Expressive Purpose Solely from Objective Evidence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 577, 588-89 (2000) (“Unlike Hurley, the 
Roberts Trilogy carefully examined the expressive purposes of an organization to determine whether the forced 
inclusion of a protected class of individuals would substantially burden any clearly defined  expressive goals of the 
organization.”) (emphasis added);  Hutchinson, supra  note 102, at 102 (arguing that unlike Hurley, the Roberts line 
of cases closely scrutinized the expressive purposes to find a clear expression for constitutional protection).      
 
115 Frey, supra  note 114, at 578.  This conclusion is based upon four cases in which different courts determined 
whether the BSA’s expressive purpose was an anti-homosexual message:  Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 
(N.J. 1999), Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998), Merino v. San 
Diego County Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 1997 WL 1145151 (Cal. Ct. App. May 21, 1997), and Richardson 
v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of Am. , No. 92-E-80, 1996 WL 734724 (Chicago Comm’n on Hum. Rel. 
Feb. 21, 1996).  Id. at 592-600.  The courts relied on different evidence offered by the parties to make their 
determinations.  Id. 
 
116 Id. at 601.  Evidence of an organization’s expressive purpose should be limited to objective evidence in order to 
prevent personal interpretations from changing the meaning and to avoid biases and prejudices often reflected 
inappropriately in the law.  Id. at 601-08. 
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Previously, in Invisible Empire of the Knights of the KKK v. Mayor of Thurmont ,117 the 
District Court for the District of Maryland ruled that only KKK brochures were relevant to the 
determination of the KKK’s expressive purpose, not the Grand Dragon’s view. 118  The court 
found the organization was created for a specific expressive purpose.119  The members and the 
message were co-extensive, affording constitutional protection to their expressive association. 120  
In an effort to ensure protection of expressive associa tion, courts should determine if the 
individuals joined the organization in order to express a view and whether the organization only 
admits individuals whose views are in alignment with the organization’s view. 121    
Because courts have not developed a cons istent approach to determine what evidence is 
appropriate to evaluate an organization’s expressive purpose, judges are free to evaluate the 
expression from their personal viewpoints and stereotypes.122  The Court fell prey to its own 
moral beliefs when it fo llowed the BSA’s reasoning.  In essence, the BSA claimed it only 
promote morality, thereby implying that homosexuals are forbidden because they are immoral.123  
                                                 
117 Invisible Empire of the Knights of the KKK v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281 (D. Md. 1988). 
 
118 Id. at 289 n.2.  In another case, a federal court of appeals failed to heed the school administration’s claim of its  
discrimination policy because the school failed to show written evidence referring to the discrimination in its tenets.  
See Brown v. Dade Christian Schs., 556 F.2d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 1977).  
 
119 Invisible Empire of the Knights of the KKK, 700 F. Supp at 289. 
 
120 Id. 
  
121 Breuner, supra  note 21, at 499.  As the Superior Court of New Jersey noted, the BSA’s anti-homosexual policy 
was never disseminated through the BSA hierarchy until litigation began.  Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 
270, 290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).  Also, there was evidence presented suggesting BSA members and 
leaders were unaware of such a policy.  Id. 
 
122 Hutchinson, supra  note 102, at 97. 
 
123 JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES:  THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORIT Y IN THE 
UNITED STATES 235 (1983) (analyzing the religious foundation, and finding homosexuality is immoral). However, 
many religious organizations have different opinions.  Id.  Often, expression that is in conflict with the majority’s 
basic beliefs is denied protection, and deemed irrational and devalued, thereby leading to total suppression.  Id.  
Brent H. Allen, Note, The First Amendment and Homosexual Expression:  The Need for an Expanded 
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However, the BSA has never consistently made any explicit statement espousing the belief that 
homosexuality is immoral.  In addition, one court has classified moral considerations as “social 
judgments” that are inappropriate to determine constitutional protection. 124  In essence, by basing 
the ruling on its own beliefs, the Court advocated the belief that homosexuality is immoral. 125  
Separation by force of law conveys a strong social stigma and perpetuates the stereotypes and 
circumstances on which the stereotypes thrive.126   
The purpose of determining an organization’s actual expression is to ensure that the 
exclusionary membership policy is a mechanism promoting an identifiable constitutional right,127 
not a pretext.128  As Justice Stevens points out, he is  “unaware of any previous instances” where 
the Court gave deference to a party’s claim.129  Previous decisions by the Supreme Court 
required courts to conduct an independent review of each party’s claim and the facts 
                                                                                                                                                             
Interpretation, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1073, 1077 (1994).  However, this type of expression is exactly what the First 
Amendment was created to protect.  Id. at 1076-77.  The speech of homosexuals is a primary example of this type of 
speech that the Constitution protects.  Id. at 1086-87. 
 
124 benShalom v. Secretary of the Army , 489 F. Supp. 964, 976 (E.D. Wis 1980).  The Army discharged the plaintiff 
after she “evidenced” an interest in homosexuality.  Id. at 969.  However, sexual preference was considered as 
irrelevant as skin color or gender in accomplishing the plaintiff’s duties.  Id. at 973-74.  The Army’s discharge 
policy was substantially outweighed by the “chill” imposed on the First Amendment rights of the soldiers.  Id. at 
974.   
 
125 Gomez, supra note 7, at 127.  Some examples of judicial findings on homosexuality include “loathsome and 
disgusting,” “grossly repugnant,” and “unfit to be named among Christians.”  Id. 
 
126 Larsen, supra note 15, at 401.  Although speaking in terms of racial stereotypes, where organizations 
discriminate based on race, the same may be applied to other stereotypes, including homosexuality.  Id.  Conversely, 
others argue that separation actually decreases prejudice and increases tolerance.  Marshall, supra  note 83, at 88-89.  
“[I]t reinforces the false notion that it is unsafe to have homosexuals  around young boys.”  Frank, supra  note 6 at 36. 
 
127 Marshall, supra  note 83, at 80.  Others argue an exclusionary membership policy should always be protected.  Id.   
 
128 Frank, supra  note 6, at 63. 
 
129 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2471 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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presented.130  However, some scholars suggest that the Supreme Court should recognize that the 
inclusion of a member is an expression of the fact that the excluded person is not welcome.  By 
not admitting women into the club, the Jaycees’ expressive purpose propels the notion that 
“sexism is good.”131  However, every simple act could then be considered to have an expressive 
purpose protected under the Constitution. 132   
2.  Confusing Speech and Association 
The Court’s finding in Boy Scouts of America,133 that a homosexual’s presence conveys a 
message, forces homosexuality to be regarded as a form of speech.  In the context of a freedom 
of expressive association claim, courts must confine the issue to whether the exclusion was based 
on the person’s expressed views or whether the exclusion was impermissibly based on the 
person’s status.134   
A person may reveal his status through visual observation or self- identifying speech. 135  
However, because sexual orientation is an invisible characteristic, only self- identifying speech 
can reveal such a person’s homosexual status.136  Self- identifying speech, also referred to as 
                                                 
130 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 567-58 (1995); Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 285 (1964). 
 
131 See Perlman, supra  note 24, at 122.  This view derives from Justice Douglas’ dissenting opinion in Lathrop v. 
Donohue, where he stated that “joining is one method of expression.”  Lathrop v. Donohue, 437 U.S. 820, 882 
(1961) (Douglas, J.,  dissenting).   
 
132 See Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. J. 624, 654 (1980). 
 
133 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). 
 
134 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1235 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., concurring).  If exc lusion is based 
upon the person’s expressed views, then the court must determine if the person’s expressed views actually conflict 
with the organization’s expressive purpose.  See supra notes 83-90, 114 and accompanying text. 
 
135 See Jack M. Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization:  First Amendment Principles and Anti-
Discrimination Laws, 76 U. DET . MERCY L. REV. 189, 326 (1999).  Religious identity is similar in that it is an 
invisible trait.  Id.  The only way to express either religious or sexual identity is by a form of communication.  Id.   
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“outness” in terms of homosexuals, is crucial to constructing one’s identity or status.137  Because 
“outness” is crucial to homosexual identity, it is inseparable from the person’s identity; therefore, 
discrimination based on “outness” is discrimination based on homosexual identity. 138  As Justice 
Brennan once stated, it is realistically impossible to separate a homosexual’s statements from his 
status.139   
As Justice Stevens suggests in his dissent in Boy Scouts of America, once a person is 
known to be homosexual, the person is permanently labeled as such, thereby justifying 
exclusion. 140   Organizations often justify exclusion on multiple assumptions:  the homosexual 
person will openly advocate and express homosexuality, 141 and that advocacy will conflict with 
                                                                                                                                                             
136 Gomez, supra  note 7, at 148-49.  Homosexuality is not an easily identifiable feature such as skin color or gender.  
Id.  Another person may only learn of one's sexual orientation by force, expressive actions, or announcement.  Id. 
 
137 Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1718 (1993).  See also  Hernandez-Montiel 
v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Sexual orientation and sexual identity are immutable; they are so 
fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be required to abandon them.”). 
 
138 See Hutchinson, supra  note 102, at 123.  However, Hutchinson argues in the alternative, that even if "outness" 
was separate from identity, it would provide an easy way out of the public accommodation laws.  Id. at 124. 
 
139 See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1017 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The Supreme 
Court denied the writ of certiorari, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented.  Id. at 1009.  Justice Brennan 
found the evidence to indicate that the petitioner’s sexual orientation was made known from her daily conversations.  
Id. at 1016.  The evidence merely indicated that the petitioner’s “speech” was only a natural consequence of her 
sexual orientation, and therefore a separate freedom of speech claim is not warranted.  Id. at 1017 (emphasis added). 
 
140 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2476 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 
141 Gomez, supra  note 7, at 132-33.  Homo sexuals may project their identity through various forms of public 
expression.  Id.  This include acts such as visiting places where homosexuals congregate, same-sex dancing, 
participating in political marches, publicly displaying affection, or wearing a symbol of homosexual equality.  Id.  
One must note that Gomez’s examples do not include mere homosexual presence.  Id.  However, other scholars 
argue that expression of identity conveys a message that the person has “come out,” but also intends to act out that 
identity.  Hunter, supra  note 137, at 1696.  The New Jersey Supreme Court disregarded this assumption, noting that 
Dale had no past, present, or future intent to use his position to advocate homosexuality.  Dale v. Boy Scouts of 
Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1229 (N.J. 1999).  See also  Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2477 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The majority 
opinion also acknowledges Dale’s lack of interest in advocating homosexuality, but disposes of the argument by 
stating that on his own admission, he is a co-president and member of a gay rights activist group.  Id. at 2454. 
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the organization's expression. 142  Often, these assumptions arise because a person’s character is 
presumed from his or her sexual practices, which in turn are presumed from his or her sexual 
orientation. 143  However, being homosexual does not indicate the individual’s political, religious, 
or moral beliefs.144  The majority of homosexual stereotypes are groundless and inaccurate.145  
Courts must not afford constitutional protection to rumors or generalizations.146   
3.  Silencing Self- identifying Speech 
Another difficulty with the Boy Scouts of America147 ruling is that it forces homosexuals 
to remain silent.148  Organizations invoking a right to expressive association should not be able to 
use a freedom of speech defense because the presence of a homosexual does not necessitate the 
fact that the person will advocate homosexuality through speech. 149  The status of homosexuality 
                                                 
142 Breuner, supra  note 21, at 508.  Political activity or public expressions of intimacy have been suggested as 
expressions that would directly conflict with an organization’s expressive purpose, not purely homosexual status.  
Id. 
 
143 Battaglia, supra  note 135, at 357-58.  This is based upon a distinction between sexual orientation discrimination, 
which is a morally controversial activity, and racial discrimination, which is a morally neutral characteristic and 
therefore does not invoke any character presumptions. Id.  
 
144 See California v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).  See also  Nan D. Hunter, Expressive 
Identity:  Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 34 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 1, 19-23 (2000) (criticizing the Court’s 
inability to distinguish between “viewpoint” and “point of viewing”).  “Point of viewing” is a shared position, such 
as exclusion based on a specific characteristic, from which one’s views emerge; whereas “viewpoint” is specific 
opinions on specific issues.  Id. 
 
145 Breuner, supra  note 21, at 487. 
 
146 Id. at 508. 
 
147 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). 
 
148 Hutchinson, supra  note 102, at 103.  Hutchinson suggests that when the Court in Hurley distinguished between 
discrimination based upon carrying a banner and discrimination based upon homosexuality, it silenced homosexuals.  
Id.  The Court tailored the decision to permit discrimination based upon “outness.”  Id.  If the expression of 
homosexuality is characterized as speech, the only alternative to protecting it is viewed as chilling expression and 
forcing affirmation of heterosexuality.  Gomez, supra  note 7, at 142.  See also  Hunter, supra  note 137, at 1719.  “To 
compel silence, then, is to force persons who are not heterosexual in effect to lie.”  Id.    
  
149 Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1240 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., concurring).  Justice Handler 
discusses how Dale’s identity does not express a view about homosexuality or morality.  Id.  He distinguishes Dale 
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is not equivalent to speech. 150  In an effort to uphold discrimination based on actual expression of 
beliefs, the courts created a false dichotomy between a person’s speech and status.151  However, 
the courts must realize this self- identifying speech is part of a person’s identity. 152  A person’s 
sexual orientation is an invisible trait, only made known by a form of speech. 153  As pointed out 
in Roberts, the ability to define one’s identity is central to the concept of liberty. 154  If the very 
means by which people communicate their identities justifies discrimination, then protection 
afforded by anti-discrimination laws is illusory. 155  Because of the Boy Scouts of America156 
decision, homosexual status may now be considered a form of speech, justifying the exclusion 
from an association or forcing the individual to remain silent.     
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Before Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,157 there was hope that the lower courts could tailor 
their freedom of expressive association analysis decisions to exclude Hurley v. Irish-American 
                                                                                                                                                             
from Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, where a Boy Scout was rightfully denied 
membership because he used his membership as a platform for advocating the morality of homosexuality.  Id. at 
1240 n.5 (citing Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998)).  See also 
supra  note 141. 
 
150 See Hunter, supra  note 137, at 1719. 
 
151 See Allen, supra  note 123, at 1097.  This dichotomy is rooted in upholding the military’s “don’t ask, don’t  tell” 
policy.  Id. at 1102.  The individual may be discharged on the grounds of homosexual status; however, discharge 
based upon speech alone would be unconstitutional.  Id.  Allen argues that the courts must recognize various forms 
of speech, including those which may fall into a new “guise,” such as “coming out.”  Id. 
 
152 See supra  notes 137-38 and accompanying text. 
 
153 See supra  notes 137-38 and accompanying text. 
 
154 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 
(1978)).  
 
155 See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1240 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., concurring). 
 
156 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). 
 
157 Id. 
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Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.158  However, by analogizing to Hurley,159 the 
Supreme Court found homosexual status equivalent to pure speech.  In addition, an 
organization’s claimed expressive purpose is not independently reviewed, but is given deference 
by the court.  Previously, critics feared the Roberts Trilogy would annihilate the diversity of 
organizations.160  Unfortunately, failing to realize the unique circumstances of homosexuals 
creates the opposite result.  This decision applies not only to homosexuals, but also to any 
viewpoint an organization would consider different.161  Critics now believe the Supreme Court 
has given organizations more legal authority to discriminate.162  Organizations now have a leg 
up, but at whose expense?163 
                                                 
158 Hutchinson, supra  note 102, at 104-09 (citing decisions that ignore the Hurley decision:  Hsu v. Roslyn Union 
Free Sch. Dist. No. 3 , 85 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996) and Elks Lodges No. 719 & No. 2021 v. Department of Alchoholic 
Beverage Control , 905 P.2d 1189 (Utah 1995)).    
 
159 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 
160 See, e.g., Linder, supra  note 22, at 1898-1902.  
 
161 “The majority’s interpretation . . . would leave the Boy Scouts and other like organizations free to discriminate 
not just against . . . those whose beliefs arguably conflict with the group’s most central philosophy -- but against 
anyone at all on a sheer whim.”  Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am.,  993 F.2d 1267, 1279 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cummings, J., 
dissenting).  
 
162 Julie Brienza, Court’s Decision on Gay Scouts Unlikely to End Discussion on “Freedom of Association,” 36 
TRIAL 12, 14 (2000). 
 
163 See, e.g ., Jane Gross, Scouting Debate Leaves Children Caught in Middle; Uproar Over Excluding Gays 
Disrupts Young Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2000, at 1-33.  In the aftermath of the Supre me Court’s decision to allow 
the Boy Scouts of America to exclude homosexuals, many wonder “where does that leave the children?  Are they 
being deprived of a valuable experience so adults can stand on principle?  Or will they be enriched by being part of a 
significant civic debate . . .?”  See also  Kate Zernike, Scouts Successful Ban on Gays Is Followed by Loss in 
Support, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at A1 (discussing recent debates by municipalities, companies and civic 
organizations to withdraw financial and physical support from the Boy Scouts).  
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